CHAPTER FIVE
Stoic contributions to current ethics
Indian philosophy offers a process–meditation– through which the sage will realize that she is a part of the whole. The Stoics emphasized reason as the way to perform this process, but the Stoics could not describe the process nor point out anyone who had actually ever performed it. Meditation suffers from neither of these liabilities. For the process of meditation is extensively described in many traditional scriptures and Eastern philosophy can point to many people, such as the Dalai Lama, Zen meditators, and Hindu saints, who have meditated for a long time and realized their connection to the larger whole.
Furthermore Indian philosophy offers a reason why the sage will be happy: when the sage works for the larger whole, that whole gives back joy and happiness. For this reason, the sage will have an incentive to do God’s work and will be happy while being concerned for the whole. In his twenty five years studying what kind of people are the happiest, Csikzentmihalyi maintains that the happiest people are those who lose their self-consciousness and merge with some larger purpose or activity.[1] He maintains that our happiest experiences are when we transcend the normal boundaries of our selves and become part of something larger.[2] The psychologist Abraham Maslow also studied these experiences and called them peak experiences. Maslow said these times were the happiest moments of people’s lives as they experienced great awe, bliss, ecstasy and tremendous meaning and joy in their lives during these experiences.[3]
As one who meditates and has often had these peak experiences, I can testify that Indian philosophy and Maslow are right. I am so much more joyously alive when I connect to the larger whole and meditation helps me to realize my connection to the whole. Furthermore, the happiness that comes from connecting to this whole is much more intense and satisfying than that which comes from pursuing selfish desires. For this reason I and many people are happily willing to do what is for the good of the larger whole as the larger whole gives back to them joy, creativity and a sense of purpose.
Stoic philosophy is deficient because it overemphasized the capability of reason to achieve this connection to the larger whole and it did not sufficiently emphasize the joy that comes from connecting to the whole. While Indian philosophy has these good aspects, it has much worse drawbacks as it has no basis for a satisfactory social ethic because it has other major flaws. Thus Yoga and Jainism is centered on individual liberation, the Gita is supportive of the caste system and Buddhism is centered on individual liberation or often denies that the world even exists.
The modification I am proposing in Stoic philosophy is not a radical departure from the orthodox Stoic position. The basic Stoic position is to follow nature. This injunction has content because the Stoics conceive of nature as an organism that we are members of and our duty is to do our part in this organic whole. This conception of nature means that for the Stoics the virtuous life is following God’s will and doing our part in the larger whole. This is the only good and it alone makes us completely happy. All these positions and their implications are kept in my modification of the Stoic position. The only thing I reject is the argument that the way to realize our connection to the larger whole is through reason alone. This modification does not demolish the foundation of Stoic ethics. Indeed, when I discuss impartialism later in this chapter, I will show that the major and most influential strand of early Stoicism had already de-emphasized the importance of reason. This major group of Stoics said that the sage did not follow impartial reason in his deliberations but followed his own natural propensities, abilities and desires. Thus some of the most important early Stoics had already taken a major move in de-emphasizing the importance of reason in Stoic ethics and my modification is squarely in that major tradition.
Empirical studies support the idea that the sage is a happy person as he gets beyond the normal boundaries of the self. Furthermore, evidence I presented in the first chapter concerning the gate theory of pain shows that the sage can be happy even if she is being tortured. Nor does the common criticism that the Stoic sage is unhappy because of the way he deals with his emotions stand up to criticism. Therefore the Stoics are right in their major claim about the happiness of the sage once it is modified by Indian philosophy.
One very surprising Stoic claim- that the sage is always happy, even if tortured- is indeed true. There are two more reasons for us to be interested in Stoic ethical theory as there are two major ethical debates the Stoics can contribute to. The first debate is the recent one about the inadequacies of impartialism. Stoic ethical theory develops into a very interesting and relevant synthesis of partialism and impartialism that is better than many modern theories that try to incorporate partialism into their ethics. The second debate concerns the nature of the emotions and their relation to values, judgments and anger.
Impartialism and partialism
Since Kant and the Utilitarians a major concern for Western ethics has been treating everyone impartially. Impartiality means that we should not give any special weight to our own desires or interests over those of any other people in making our moral decisions. It also entails that we cannot give any special treatment to people who are near to us just because they stand in this relationship to us. Instead, “we should try to adopt a neutral standpoint, detaching ourselves as far as possible from our own special desires and involvements.”[4] Recently impartialism has come under strong attack as it does not leave room for special obligations such as friendship, family or integrity. Impartiality disregards our personal circumstances and so it appears to say that we must treat everyone the same. It makes no moral difference if someone is our spouse or child; we have to act as if these relationships do not exist as we cannot give them special treatment.[5] Partialism denies that treating everyone equally is the proper goal of an ethical theory. It maintains that we can treat ourselves and our friends and family with special concern and also weight our own interests more.
Stocker points out that universalism and impartialism are an advance over moralities of status and position, but if we consider our family and friends in an impartial manner we have a morally defective ethics.[6] Cottingham argues that we need to give special affection to our children precisely because they are our own, so we have a specific duty to be partial. He says that no ethical system worth its salt says otherwise.[7] Cottingham even goes farther and says that impartiality, because it does not allow for special concerns such as treating our children with more love than other children, leads to “repugnant and absurd consequences which ultimately threaten the very basis of our humanity.”[8]
The Stoics on impartialism and partialism
Stoic ethical theory has something to contribute to this debate as it is a combination of partiality and impartiality. It takes the view that we have certain special relationships without regressing into the negative features of partiality such as nationalism or sexism.
The first point to demonstrate about the Stoic theory is that it is not purely an impartialist ethical system. This is particularly important because many important commentators such as MacIntyre and Annas misinterpret Stoicism by only noticing the impartial side of Stoicism and ignoring the strong partialist aspects of their system. Annas states that the “Stoics are the first ethical theorists clearly to commit themselves to the thesis that morality requires impartiality to all others from the moral point of view.”[9] This is not the whole truth and any view which sees the Stoics as pure impartialists not only misunderstands them, but fails to see what they can contribute to the present discussion about partialism and impartialism. The Stoics’ deepest commitment is to following nature, not to being rational like Kant. The Stoics are not impartialists, but something much more interesting: a synthesis of partiality and impartiality that develops from their idea of following nature.
There is a clear and definite element of impartiality to Stoic ethics as they maintain we are all a part of divine reason and have to do our part to advance reason. This impartiality is made clear in their process of oikeiosis. At first the person has primarily an animal nature and is orientated like an animal. But as the human matures, his nature changes and he realizes who he fundamentally is: a rational creature. As all humans share in this rationality, the sage comes to regard all humans as an extension of his rational self and thus to be cared for as much as himself.[10] By this process, the sage makes himself akin to everything rational. As the entire community of reason is an extension of his own rational self, there is a perfect unity of concern for the self and the society at large.[11] So the sage disregards his particular interests and does what advances reason as a whole. Cicero describes someone in this advanced state of oikeiosis: “They hold that the universe is governed by divine will; it is a city or state of which both men and gods are members, and each one of us is a part of this universe; from which it is a natural consequence that we should prefer the common advantage to our own. For just as the laws set the safety of all above the safety of individuals, so a good, wise and law-abiding man, conscious of his duty to the state, studies the advantage of all, more than that of himself or of any single individual.”[12]
Even though the Stoics sometime advocate impartiality, it would be a mistake to see this as the only aspect of their ethical system. Many modern commentators misinterpret the Stoics as impartialists because they see them through Kantian lenses. Thus when they see the Stoics advocating that we should live according to reason, they think the Stoics mean the same thing by that phrase as Kant meant. Thus these commentators interpret the Stoics as being like early Kantians advocating total impartiality to all people. Annas is the major proponent of this mistaken interpretation. She says that while the Greeks did not have any word for impartiality, the Stoics had the idea. She defines impartiality as requiring two things, first that we not weigh our own interests more because they are our own, and secondly that someone not weigh his own particular attachments and commitments more merely because they are his own. She says “this is surely what Stoic ethical theory requires.”[13]
Annas is wrong. While Stoics have an ethical theory with impartial aspects, their theory also has aspects that lead them to advocate partiality. Thus Annas is mistaken when she says the Stoics have “no distinctive ethical role here for philia, commitment to particular other people,” or that according to the Stoics we “have no ethical reason” to be attached to particular other people.[14]
One can only maintain that the Stoics are total impartialists if one ignores many aspects of Stoic theory. For while one side of their ethics- their doctrine of oikeiosis- drives them to be impartialist, two other aspects of their ethical doctrine pull them in the partialist direction. The first is their notion of living according to nature and the way they develop this doctrine. The second is their notion of relationships and God having assigned us to a certain place in the world. I will show that the total impartialist interpretation of the Stoics is untenable and then explain the other doctrines they had which drove them to a partialist view. Finally, I will discuss why their position is better than the modern partialist positions currently being discussed.
Annas states her strong impartialist interpretation of the Stoics in this way: “The fully virtuous Stoic will ignore, as irrelevant, differences between people that are not sanctioned by the rational point of view; and thus will come to have no more concern for his own interests, from the moral point of view, than for any other rational being.”[15] While there is evidence for Annas’ point of view which I have already cited, there are also many glaring problems for this thesis. Most importantly there are many passages of applied business ethics preserved in Cicero that make a mockery of this interpretation.
Diogenes of Babylon on partialism and the sage
In one long passage which I follow Annas by quoting in full, the two people involved in the discussion are Antipater and Diogenes of Babylon. They were both heads of the Stoic school and so are Stoics of unimpeachable credentials:
Suppose, for example that a good man has brought a large cargo of grain from Alexandria to Rhodes. At Rhodes there is scarcity and famine, and produce is extremely expensive. He knows that several other merchants have set sail from Alexandria- indeed on their voyage he has seen their ships laden with grain making for Rhodes. Should he tell this to the Rhodians, or by keeping quiet sell his own cargo for as much as he can get? We are supposing him to be a wise and good man; we are asking about the deliberations and considerations of a person who would not conceal this from the Rhodians if he judged this to be wrong, but is wondering whether it might not really be wrong.
In cases of this kind Diogenes of Babylon, a great and serious Stoic, consistently decides one way, his pupil Antipater, a brilliant man, the other. Antipater thinks that all should be disclosed, so that the buyer should not be unaware of anything whatsoever that the seller knows. Diogenes thinks that the seller must tell of any defects, insofar as this is legally prescribed, but otherwise merely act without trickery, and, since he is selling, aim to sell for as much as he can get. ‘I have imported it, put it on sale, my price is no higher than the others- even less when the supply is greater- who is wronged?’
Antipater’s speech begins on the other side: ‘What do you mean? You ought to act in the interests of your fellow humans and serve human fellowship; that is the law under which you were born, and the principles of nature you contain, which you should obey and follow, are that your advantage should be the common advantage and conversely the common advantage yours. Will you still conceal from your fellow humans what relief and what plenty are at hand?’ Diogenes will perhaps reply as follows: ‘It is one thing to conceal, another thing not to tell. I am not now concealing anything from you, if I am not telling you what the nature of the gods is and what the final good is, which would be a lot more use to you to know than a drop in the price of corn. But it is not the case that I have to tell you whatever it is advantageous to you to know.’
‘Oh yes you do,’ Antipater will say, ‘if you remember at all that there is such a thing as fellowship among humans joined together by nature.’ ‘I do remember that,’ Diogenes will say, ‘but surely that fellowship is not such that no-one has anything of their own? If that is so, no-one has anything to sell, only to give away.’ You see that in the whole of this dispute no-one says this: ‘Although this may be wrong, still I will do it, because it is advantageous.’ Rather one sides says that it is advantageous without being wrong, and the other side, that it is precisely because it is wrong that it should not be done.[16]
The first thing to point out is that these two major Stoics are quite explicitly discussing the wise and good man, that is the sage. The sage is someone who has fully realized his link with humanity and reason and is akin to all that is rational. Because of this, we should expect the sage to act impartially and for the good of all. This is the position Antipater takes as he says that the wise and good merchant will care for all as he realizes that we are all linked in common fellowship and so the sage has to watch out for the common good. Diogenes of Babylon, however, disagrees with this interpretation of how a sage will act. He says that the wise and good man is not impartial but watches out for his own interests first. Diogenes of Babylon maintains this is perfectly okay as long as the sage does not do anything illegal.
This passage is troubling for those who hold the position that Stoic ethical theory requires total impartiality. For in this passage Diogenes of Babylon is denying that even the sage has to watch out for others’ interest and so not even the sage is required to be impartial. To her credit, Annas attempts to deal with this passage, but not in a very plausible manner. First she says that Cicero misrepresented the debate and misunderstood Diogenes of Babylon’s position. Although it seems the two Stoics disagree, she says that “Cicero’s presentation of the alleged dispute between him [Diogenes] and Antipater is in many ways misleading.”[17] Second, Annas maintains that Diogenes of Babylon was only concerned about legal obligations in this passage and not about moral obligations at all. So in her view, both Stoics were concerned with different things.[18] Third, she says we “have no reason to think that Diogenes recommended the minimalist view that all that is morally required of an agent is that he fulfill his legal obligations.” According to Annas’ interpretation “Diogenes is not asking whether he ought to morally further their [other peoples'] interests; nor is he claiming that he has fulfilled his moral duty by acting in a way which merely does not violate their rights; he is merely asking if any right have been violated here, to which the answer is, ‘no’; there is not inuiria.”[19]
As the passage seems to be presenting a straightforward case of disagreement among the Stoics over whether a sage is impartial, the only way I can understand Annas’ interpretation is that she is a priori convinced that the Stoics are always impartialists and so they must be impartialists in this case too. Thus she misreads the passage and maintains that Cicero, who obviously was a lot closer to the debate than we are, must have misrepresented the debate. Furthermore, as I will soon show, there is much more evidence that some major Stoics did take a minimalist position that our moral duties were bounded by the law. Moreover, her position that Diogenes of Babylon is claiming that there is no injury is clearly not adequate because Cicero quotes more discussion between the two Stoics which shows he was not concerned about injuring other people.
This further discussion is another case of applied business ethics and it concerns how much information someone selling a house has to give to prospective buyers. The house is unsanitary and unhealthy. Nevertheless “people are not aware that maggots are appearing in all the bedrooms, and that it is built of bad timber and about to collapse. No-one knows this but the owner.”[20] Antipater maintains that the owner has to tell all the defects of the house to any prospective buyer. Diogenes of Babylon disagrees with this position maintaining that this honesty would be stupid. Diogenes says: “Where the buyer can use his own judgment, what deception can there be on the seller’s part? We do not have to stand by everything we say- do you think we should stand by what was not said? What could be more stupid than a seller’s reciting the faults of the object he is selling? What could be more absurd that the owner ordering the auctioneer to announce, ‘An unsanitary house for sale.”[21]
In the case of buying an unhealthy house with maggots crawling around the bedroom and which is about to fall down, the buyer is injured if he buys it. So Annas’ interpretation of Diogenes of Babylon’s position being about the law and not injuring people is untenable. Nor is this the only case where Diogenes of Babylon maintains a sage can injure someone else in a business deal. For Cicero quotes another passage of applied business ethics that involves Diogenes of Babylon. Again in this case it is made clear that the discussion is about the sage and so the Stoics are discussing the most advanced person who supposedly is akin to all rational beings and cares for them equally. “‘If a wise man in an unguarded moment should accept counterfeit coins, supposing them to be legal currency, and should afterwards discover his error, may he pass them on to a creditor as good money?’ Diogenes answers in the affirmative; Antipater, in the negative- and he is right. As to the query whether a wine merchant who knows that his stock is deteriorating should so inform his customers, Diogenes insists that such frankness is not necessary, Antipater declares that honesty is the invariable characteristic of the good man.”[22]
Again it is clear that Diogenes of Babylon thinks it is okay for the wise person to engage in shady business practices. So clearly for all the Stoics not even the sage impartially watches out for everyone’s interests. Annas is wrong in thinking that Diogenes of Babylon is only maintaining the position that obeying the laws does no one harm. This is made especially clear when we consider that passing counterfeit coins was a serious offense and liable to severe punishment at that time.
Other Stoics on partialism and the sage
Annas’ interpretation is made even more untenable when we realize that Diogenes of Babylon was not the sole advocate of the position that the sage not only is not impartial, but he will do anything legal to watch out for his own interests. In discussing impartiality, Cicero says: “But we are not called upon to disregard our own welfare and to yield to others what we need for ourselves; each of us is under obligation to take proper care of his interests, so long as he does not thereby trespass upon the rights of his neighbor. Among the many mots of Chrysippus, the following is notable: ‘He who runs a race must exert every ounce of his strength and energy to win; but he must neither trip his opponent nor thrust him off the course with his hands. So in life, while it is not wrong for us to seek those things that are needful for us, we may not take them away from our fellows.’”[23]
So Chrysippus supports a view very much like Diogenes of Babylon’s view: we can watch out for our own interests as long as we do not harm other people’s fair chances. Nor are these the only major Stoics who argue against the kind of total impartiality Annas interprets the Stoics as advocating. Another major Stoic, Hecaton, “declares that there is nothing at all which he will refrain from doing for his own advantage, except what the law plainly forbids.”[24] This is not the only passage which talks of Hecaton’s lack of impartiality. “The sixth book of Hecaton’s work On Duties is full of such questions as this: ‘When food prices are outrageously high, may a good man refuse to feed his slaves?’ He presents both sides of the case, but his conclusion is that duty is to be determined here by considerations of what he calls expediency rather than by sympathy. He also asks whether a merchant, forced by a storm at sea to jettison part of his cargo, should choose to give up a valuable horse or a contemptible and worthless slave. Here interest in his property pulls him in one direction; human feeling, in the other.”[25]
In the first case, Hecaton is specifically wondering what the good man will do and saying that it is okay for him not to feed his slaves. As lack of food will harm the slave, Hecaton is saying that even the good Stoic will not act impartially to all human beings. For in this case a major Stoic maintains that the good man’s money is more important than the care of another person he is responsible for.
Part of the reason Annas makes her mistake interpreting Cicero’s passages about business ethics is that she thinks Diogenes of Babylon was merely continuing the doctrines of the early Stoics and was not at all innovative.[26] The latest scholarship, however, shows that Diogenes of Babylon was a major transitional figure in Stoic thought. “There is in fact extensive evidence, to which insufficient attention is paid in the standard histories of Hellenistic philosophy, that Diogenes was responsible for a far-reaching modification in the character of Stoic moral and political philosophy.”[27] In particular, the changes in Stoicism that are usually ascribed to contact with Rome and Roman culture actually go back to Diogenes of Babylon.